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Abstract 
 
If hearers are sensitive to Gricean maxims of Quantity (Grice, 1975/1989), they should disfavour 
expressions which give too little or too much information for the unique identification of an intended 
referent. Accordingly, cooperative speakers are expected to provide all and only as much information as 
is necessary for their interlocutor to uniquely identify a referent.  Engelhardt et al. (2006) report that 
speakers and hearers are sensitive to under-informativeness but not to over-informativeness. Based on 
this finding, the authors re-interpret the literature which claims to document pragmatic effects in 
language comprehension and instead attribute previous findings to structural-lexical biases. We argue 
that the reason why speakers and hearers seemed insensitive to over-informativeness in Engelhardt et 
al.’s studies was because certain aspects of their experiments favoured the use of redundant 
information. Our experiments 1 and 2 manipulate these factors, revealing that hearers are in fact 
sensitive to violations of over- as well as under-informativeness. A further production experiment shows 
that speakers do not under- or over-specify when the factors that favoured over-informativeness in 
Engelhardt et al.’s study are removed. The findings provide evidence that speakers and hearers are 
sensitive to both Quantity maxims, and suggest that the effects obtained in previous literature should 
indeed be attributed to pragmatic factors. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When referring to a specific entity, speakers have a wide choice of potential forms with which to direct 
an interlocutor’s attention to their intended target. The choice of referring expression (RE) reflects not 
only properties of the target referent, but also contrasting properties of other entities in the physical or 
linguistic context (Clark and Bangerter, 2004; Clark et al., 1983; Pechmann, 1984, 1989). For 
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unambiguous reference, an RE must be contrastive, containing enough information to allow a hearer 
uniquely to pick out the intended referent from other candidates in the context. In this way, 
cooperative speakers adhere to the first Gricean maxim of Quantity, which stipulates that utterances 
should be as informative as is required ( Grice, 1975/1989), and also to the submaxim of Manner ‘avoid 
ambiguity’. For example, a speaker would not be expected to refer to one of two mutually available 
apples as ‘the apple’. In such a situation, a hearer would struggle to establish reference without the 
provision of contrastive modification. 
 
What happens when speakers go beyond using minimally contrastive expressions and include additional 
modifiers in their REs? Expressions that provide more information than the communicative situation 
requires should still succeed in picking out a target referent. However, side-effects can result from the 
use of overspecifying expressions. Grice proposed a second maxim of Quantity stating that speakers 
should provide no more information than is needed for the purposes of the exchange. Grice conceded 
that this second maxim is disputable (1989:26), but added that a hearer may be misled into thinking 
that there is a particular point to the provision of excess information. Empirically, inferential effects 
have been shown to arise routinely in the processing of modified referring expressions ( Sedivy, 2003; 
Sedivy et al., 1999, i.a.). For example, on hearing the RE ‘the big apple’, hearers fixate more quickly on 
the target in the presence of a contrast mate (i.e. a smaller apple) as they infer a rational motivation for 
the speaker’s inclusion of the modification. 
 
The question of whether speakers and hearers are indeed sensitive to under-informativeness (which 
derives from Grice’s maxim of Quantity-1, hereafter Q-1) and over-informativeness (from Quantity-2, 
hereafter Q-2) is still under debate. This issue not only has implications for the psychological validity of 
pragmatic maxims, but also for the wider field of sentence processing. In particular, it is relevant to how 
non-syntactic constraints influence the interpretation of syntactically ambiguous constructions: 
potentially over-informative utterances such as ‘put the apple on the towel in the box’ have been 
widely used in investigations into the effect of referential context on incremental processing ( 
Tanenhaus  et al., 1995, i.a.). Should sensitivity to over-informativeness be found, what is its influence 
on sentence processing relative to other pragmatic constraints such as unique referent identification 
(governed by Q-1)? For example, if an RE uniquely identifies a referent, does its over-informativeness 
concede a processing penalty? Do nonlinguistic features such as attribute salience modulate the effect 
of over-informativeness? For instance, would REs such as ‘the large apple’ in contexts containing a 
single but saliently large apple cause the same inferential effects as when the apple was not saliently 
large? In other words, how strongly do Gricean expectations about optimal informativeness constrain 
comprehension and production, relative to other linguistic and nonlinguistic features? 
 
A promising approach to this question is to measure off-line sensitivity to informativeness, and explore 
how this is affected by the presence or absence of relevant contextual features. In order to monitor the 
impact of nonlinguistic features such as salience or referential complexity, sensitivity to informativeness 
should initially be measured in baseline contexts without these marked features. Sensitivity should then 
be re-tested with contextual manipulations which add these potentially competitive constraints. The 
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studies in this paper examine informativeness sensitivity in two distinct visual worlds (one complex, one 
simple) in order to explore how non-pragmatic constraints affect Gricean sensitivities. The results have 
implications for future research into the interplay of constraints on the form of referring expressions 
produced, on the associated judgement of pragmatic felicity, and on referential comprehension more 
widely. 
 
The primary research question driving this paper investigates whether adults are sensitive to Q-1 and Q-
2. First we present a brief review of the overarching theoretical framework and the links between the 
Gricean view of conversation and constraints on referential processing. We then discuss the existing 
literature on the comprehension and production of under- and over-informativeness. We report three 
new experiments: two which measure hearer sensitivity to the Gricean maxims of Quantity and one 
which measures speaker sensitivity. In the general discussion, we explore the implications of these 
results with reference to the existing literature, and identify three possible accounts of the role of 
Gricean considerations in referential processing. Although the current experiments cannot conclusively 
adjudicate between these possibilities, they provide input to future research which could address the 
positions more directly. 
 
 
1.1. Constraint-based views of language processing 
 
Constructions such as ‘put the apple on the towel in the box’ are incrementally ambiguous: the first 
prepositional phrase [PP] can momentarily function either as a destination or as a modifier of the head 
noun. Correct on-line parsing of such expressions has been argued to rely on expectations of context-
dependent informativeness. That is, constraints from the referential context (e.g. whether there are 
multiple apples in the array) interact with lexical and syntactic biases to determine the most likely 
interpretation on-line (see  Altmann, 1998 for a review). This mechanism is at the heart of the 
longstanding psycholinguistic debate over whether sentence processing uses structural (mainly 
syntactic) constraints prior to other types of linguistic and contextual information, or whether multiple 
sources of information influence the parser from the earliest stages of processing ( Boland et al., 1990; 
Ferreira and Clifton, 1986; Frazier and Rayner, 1982; Frazier,  1987; MacDonald, 1994; Tanenhaus et al., 
1989; Taraban and McClelland, 1988; Trueswell et al., 1993, i.a.). 
 
For the interpretation of ambiguous sentences, the modular account asserts that initial interpretations 
are solely based on analyses of underlying syntactic representations. The syntactic module is 
‘informationally encapsulated’ from other modules (such as referential or statistical sources of 
information) and no other knowledge is available to the parser until later in processing ( Frazier, 1987). 
Conversely, on the interactive view, multiple sources of information interact and constrain 
interpretation from the very first stages of processing. This includes information from the extra-
sentential context (e.g. the preceding discourse context or the visual referential world), the frequency 
of each interpretation in the language at large, semantic knowledge, thematic biases for each of the 
critical elements in the string, and frequency of argument structure, amongst other factors. This 
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approach posits that multiple interpretations are activated in parallel, with activation of the various 
candidates dynamically changing as the sentence unfolds, shaping the eventual interpretation. 
 
We consider that Gricean considerations should be added to the list of potential constraints shaping 
utterance interpretation. Provided that interlocutors are sensitive to informativeness, then if one 
interpretation of an ambiguous utterance is under- or over-informative, this is less likely to be the 
intended interpretation. For example, if one hears ‘put the apple on the towel. . .’ in a context 
containing one apple, the PP-as-modifier interpretation is over-informative, and hence the PP-as-
destination interpretation is more likely to be preferred. Within the constraint-based approach, our 
account predicts that Gricean maxims of Quantity influence hearers’ parsing decisions. 
 
Gricean sensitivity to informativeness might in principle influence sentence processing to a greater or 
less extent: we might broadly characterise it as all-powerful, having no influence, or being one 
constraint among many. These positions are evaluated further in section  6. 
 
 
1.2. Previous research on sensitivity to under- and over-informativeness 
 
As the two submaxims of Quantity interact asymmetrically with reference resolution constraints, 
research on sensitivity to these submaxims must consider them separately. In the referential 
communication paradigm, under-informative REs such as ‘the apple’ in the presence of two apples not 
only violate Q-1, but in doing so also fail to establish unique reference. By contrast, over-informative 
REs such as ‘the big apple’ in contexts containing a single apple only fail on one of these counts: they 
violate Q-2, but do allow the hearer to uniquely identify the intended target. The original study which 
experiment 1 aims to replicate ( Engelhardt et al., 2006; expt. 2) found that hearers were not sensitive 
to Q-2 (but were to Q-1) and thus argued that interlocutors are ‘only moderately Gricean’ ( Engelhardt 
et al., 2006:572). Should sensitivity to both maxims be found, that would strengthen the claim that 
Gricean maxims have a powerful influence on speaker and hearer behaviour. Of course, arguing for full 
Gricean sensitivity in more general contexts would require a more comprehensive review of the 
experimental literature in such areas as scalar implicature (as well as further research into the impact of 
the remaining maxims). Several studies in this domain report that under-informative descriptions (e.g. 
saying that ‘some of the horses jumped over the fence’ when all of the horses did) are predominantly 
rejected by adults at rates that range from 60% ( Noveck, 2001) to over 85% ( Papafragou and Musolino, 
2003; Katsos and Bishop, 2011) depending on the task. In the referential communication paradigm,  
Engelhardt et al. (2006) report that under-informative descriptions are consistently penalised compared 
to optimally informative expressions. Contrastingly, the single study performed on over-informative 
utterances (Engelhardt et al., 2006, experiments 2a and 2b) found that hearers do not rate them as any 
worse than optimal expressions, even though participants in the same task rated under-informative 
utterances as significantly worse than their optimal counterparts. 
 
In Engelhardt et al.’s ratings paradigm, participants were shown photographs depicting scenes before 
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and after a change had taken place, and judged spoken utterances that described the change. In a 
typical item for the one-referent condition, the first picture showed an apple on a towel, a puppet, a 
towel with nothing on it, and an empty box. In the second picture, the apple had been moved either to 
the matching location (from towel to towel), or to a different location (from towel to box). In the 
corresponding item for the two-referent condition, the first picture showed two apples (one on a towel, 
and one by itself), a towel with nothing on it, and an empty box. Again, in the second picture, the apple 
on the towel had been moved either onto the other towel or into the empty box. The participants’ task 
was to judge whether the sentence uttered was an appropriate one to bring about the change between 
the two pictures. The sentence either contained a modifying PP after the target noun (‘put the apple on 
the towel on the other towel’), or just the location with no modification (‘put the apple on the other 
towel’). The resulting 2 2 design (sentence condition) thus contains under-informative, optimal, and 
over-informative instructions. Their results (expt. 2b) showed that hearers judged under-informative 
instructions to be significantly worse than their optimal counterparts, but they did not judge over-
informative utterances to be any worse than the corresponding optimal expressions. 
 
The authors conclude that hearers are ‘only moderately Gricean in their adherence to the Maxim of 
Quantity’ (p. 572) in that they are sensitive to under- but not to over-informativeness, at least in this 
off-line rating task. This conclusion is hard to reconcile with the Gricean account which predicts some 
leniency but not full tolerance or insensitivity towards over-informativeness. It is also surprising given 
the findings of their third experiment, which found costs in the on-line processing of over-informative 
expressions. In this experiment, participants’ eye movements were recorded as they moved objects in 
response to felicitous and infelicitous instructions. The same instructions were used as in the preceding 
experiment, but only 1-referent contexts were tested as the authors were not investigating under-
informativeness any further. Based on the previous results, the authors predicted no difference in 
fixation patterns between the optimal (‘put the apple in the box’) and over-informative (‘put the apple 
on the towel in the box’) utterances. However, differences were found between the two conditions 
regarding looks to the target, to the correct destination, and especially to the incorrect destination, 
where hearers looked to the empty towel on hearing ‘on the towel’. This suggests that, in the absence 
of a contrast set (i.e. another apple, not on a towel), participants interpret the PP ‘on the towel’ as a 
destination rather than as a modifier of the target, since Gricean expectations lead them to reject the 
latter interpretation in which the utterance is over-informative. However, in the absence of sensitivity 
to over-informativeness in their off-line ratings study, the authors reject the pragmatically oriented 
explanation of the on-line experiment, and attribute these results to structural constraints alone1. 
                                                          
1
 There are concerns about the comparability of these off-line and on-line comprehension experiments. One 
reason for the different findings may lie in the form of the required response, where the former involves 
metalinguistic reflective judgment on given, static stimuli and the latter necessitates a direct, action-based 
response. Drawing from the research tradition proposing that language processing tightly interacts with events 
unfolding in the real world (see e.g.  Tanenhaus et al., 1995 and references therein), the metalinguistic task may 
not have tapped into participants’ linguistic competence in the same way that the action-based one did, casting 
doubt on Engelhardt et al’s unification of results under one theoretical explanation (see  Altmann and Kamide, 
1999, for differences in implicit performance based on whether participants were concurrently engaging in 
metalinguistic judgements or not). 
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Specifically, they invoke Minimal Attachment to explain the building of the simpler syntactic structure 
compatible with the destination interpretation (as assumed in the Garden Path model of parsing;  
Frazier, 1978). This account removes the need to consult any referential or pragmatic sources of 
information and so accommodates the apparent lack of maxim sensitivity in experiments 1 and 2. 
Engelhardt et al. reinforce this structural explanation by positing powerful influences from the verb 
argument structure of ‘put’, which requires a location-prepositional phrase. They argue that the parser 
saturates its argument structures as quickly as possible, and hence, upon hearing ‘put’, hearers rapidly 
interpret the following PP as a destination, which is consistent with the eye movement data. Crucially, 
neither of these explanations involves pragmatic reasoning about the amount of information to be 
conveyed. Engelhardt et al. conclude that their study raises doubts about whether well-supported 
effects in sentence processing should indeed be attributed to pragmatic considerations. 
 
Despite Engelhardt et al.’s claims, on-line effects of visual/referential context are well documented, and 
are compatible with Gricean accounts of processing. Two types of studies are particularly relevant. The 
first concerns the study of temporarily ambiguous sentences, and in particular sentences where a PP is 
ambiguous between a modifier or a destination interpretation (as Engelhardt et al. used). A robust 
finding is that sentences such as ‘put the apple on the towel in the box’ cause garden-pathing, as 
hearers interpret the first PP ‘on the towel’ as the destination, and have to re-analyse this 
interpretation upon parsing the second PP. However, this garden-path is robust only in cases involving 
one referent. In the presence of a contrast set, the garden-path disappears (see e.g.  Tanenhaus et al., 
1995; Trueswell et al., 1999; Spivey  et al., 2002, i.a.). This effect is explained by Referential Theory ( 
Altmann and Steedman, 1988; Crain and Steedman,  1985) which postulates that the preferred parse of 
a sentence is the one which minimises the presuppositions (in this case, the number of entities that 
have to be additionally postulated beyond the ones that are explicitly encoded). Referential Theory is 
also compatible with Grice’s Quantity maxims: if the relevant visual world contains only one apple, a 
modifier is unnecessary for the identification of the referent. To avoid a dispreferred, over-informative 
interpretation (which would be felicitous only if an additional apple were available) the PP is correctly 
analysed as a destination. In contrast, if the visual world contains two entities of the same type, then 
modification is necessary for resolving reference. Hence, the preferred interpretation of the PP in 2-
referent contexts is as a modifier. Experimental evidence for the reality of this distinction supports the 
theory-critical conclusion that interlocutors use Gricean-like considerations in incremental sentence 
processing. 
 
In a second strand of research documenting the effects of over-informativeness,  Sedivy et al. (1999) 
and  Sedivy (2003) consider visual displays including both a contrast set and a competitor, e.g. a big and 
a small glass, and a big jug. They show that, upon hearing ‘big’, hearers fixate on the big glass before 
they hear the disambiguating noun (‘glass’ or ‘jug’). The proposed explanation for this effect is that 
hearers are engaging in Gricean inferencing, reasoning that if the speaker meant to refer to the big jug, 
they would have referred to it without a modifying adjective in order to avoid over-informativeness. 
The use of a modifying adjective thus signals that the intended referent is the one for which there is a 
contrast-mate, i.e. the big glass. Omission of the modification in that case would have led to under-
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informativeness. These results have been replicated by  Hanna et al. (2003),  Heller et al. (2008) and  
Grodner and Sedivy (2011). 
 
Taken together, the findings from post-modifying PPs and pre-modifying adjectives demonstrate effects 
from pragmatic constraints in incremental on-line processing regardless of whether or not sentences 
are syntactically ambiguous. The findings from Engelhardt et al.’s on-line experiment 3 accord 
straightforwardly with these studies: if hearers are able to reason about referential intentions based on 
Quantity considerations, then they should also experience a penalty (in this case, looking at the 
incorrect destination) when processing explicitly over-informative descriptions. 
 
However, Engelhardt and colleagues argue that their on-line findings cannot be attributed to sensitivity 
to pragmatic constraints, since hearers did not penalise over-informative descriptions in their off-line 
ratings experiment (2b). They also observe production tendencies to acknowledge the presence of two 
location objects with an expression such as ‘other’ (influencing PPs without ‘other’ to be interpreted as 
modifiers). On these grounds, Engelhardt et al. appeal to Minimal Attachment and verb argument 
structure to explain PP interpretation in their on-line data, as discussed above. 
 
This conclusion has implications for the wider debate about the nature of the linguistic parser, 
concerning whether processing is initially structure-based or whether it is interactive from an early 
stage, as discussed in section  1.1. While the interpretation of the on-line findings given by Tanenhaus, 
Trueswell, Spivey, Sedivy and colleagues falls squarely within the latter kind of account, Engelhardt et 
al.’s analysis is in line with the former approach, where information based on pragmatic considerations 
is not available at the earliest stage of language processing and instead lexical-structural information 
takes priority. 
 
Leaving aside for a moment the evidence to the contrary from Tanenhaus and colleagues, Engelhardt et 
al.’s analysis leaves us with the possibility that Gricean considerations are philosophical abstractions 
rather than psychologically real constraints on sentence processing. In their view ( Engelhardt et al., 
2006:569), speakers and hearers avoid under-descriptions that might lead to confusion about referent 
identity. This emphasis on unique identification appears to motivate sensitivity to under-
informativeness based on mechanistic reference establishment rather than on wider Gricean 
pragmatics. 
 
There are two broad reasons why this conclusion should be contested. First, research on Quantity 
implicature shows that, given a rich story context and ample time to respond, participants are very good 
at detecting under-informativeness even when this does not lead to reference assignment failure (e.g.  
Guasti et al., 2005, experiment 4;  Papafragou and  Musolino, 2003; Katsos and Bishop, 2011). Secondly, 
the complexity of the visual array used by Engelhardt et al. may have masked or blocked the application 
of Gricean constraints. In this scenario, visual processing has to deal with numerous items in a single 
array, potentially leaving fewer resources available for Gricean reasoning. This is a plausible factor given 
that sensitivity to under-informativeness decreases with available processing resources in the case of 
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Quantity implicatures (see  Bott and Noveck, 2004; De Neys and Schaeken, 2007). Moreover, the visual 
complexity may itself have motivated over-informing. Several researchers have noted that increased 
array complexity biases speakers towards giving more information (Koolen et al., 2009; Paraboni et al., 
2007; Pechmann, 1989). This arises for both hearer-directed reasons and speaker-directed reasons. 
According to the principle of distant responsibility (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), there is a pragmatic 
motivation for over-informing if referential clarity is at risk. This principle states that the amount of 
information provided by speakers depends on their estimation of the hearers’ potential for 
misunderstanding. Over-informing might also be motivated by the speaker’s ease of computation: the 
Minimal Redundancy hypothesis (Freedle, 1972) states that as the number of dimensions used to 
construct referents increases, and the number of nonreferents increases, speakers are more likely to 
give redundant messages. This is linked to a principle of economy, in that speakers expend less effort by 
encoding a redundant attribute than they would by evaluating its distinctiveness and then suppressing 
it should it turn out to be noncontrastive ( Pechmann, 1989; Whitehurst, 1976). Producing minimally 
contrastive expressions is efficient in terms of linguistic material yet costly in terms of cognitive effort. 
In Engelhardt et al.’s task, array complexity could feasibly have led participants to build redundancy into 
their message (in expt. 1) and to expect a certain degree of redundancy (in expts. 2 and 3). 
 
As well as array complexity, Engelhardt et al.’s design contains other factors that may have promoted 
over-informativeness. Their experimental contexts featured more than one identical object (such as the 
source and destination containers, e.g. the towels, in their experiment). Meanwhile, the target object 
was the only compositional object in the array (i.e. consisting of an object placed on another object). 
Consequently, hearers may have expected an overspecified RE by dint of the increased salience of both 
the multiply-occurring container and the compositional container-object (an instance of a speaker-
oriented effect). Such an effect was documented by  Carbary and Tanenhaus (2007), where the 
presence of a particular feature elsewhere in the array increased mentions of the same redundant 
feature in references to the target. In fact, over-informing as a result of visual salience can have a 
beneficial communicative effect. For example, when a partially discriminative dimension is more easily 
perceived than a fully discriminating one, overspecified REs lead to faster identification times ( Arts, 
2004; Arts et al., 2010; Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Paraboni et al., 2007). In Engelhardt et al.’s design, 
the compositional object (e.g. the apple on the towel) may have been the most salient object in the 
‘before’ photograph, leading interlocutors to produce or expect an exhaustive RE such as ‘the-apple-on-
the-towel’. These considerations may go some way towards explaining the ‘surprisingly common’ rate 
(30%) of over-descriptions observed in Engelhardt et al.’s production experiment (expt. 1). Similarly, in 
expt. 2, the hearers may not have penalised the over-informative instructions either because they were 
aware of the pressures on the speaker or because they found the ‘redundant’ information helpful. 
 
Finally, methodological factors could also be at play in Engelhardt et al.’s study. In their ratings 
experiment, participants were asked to view scenes before and after a change had taken place and rate 
spoken utterances on a scale of 1--5. A rating of 1 on this scale was an ‘incorrect’ instruction (for 
example, a wrong category label, as featured in half of the control items, or an under-informative 
referring expression), 3 indicated an ‘adequate’ instruction and 5 an instruction that ‘could not be 
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better’. Such instructions focus strongly on the semantic truth-values of the utterances and hence may 
have masked pragmatic nuances in the stimuli. Furthermore, such a scale may have encouraged 
participants to rate any utterance which was more than minimally contrastive as ‘more than adequate’, 
disposing them to give over-informative utterances a score of 4 or 5. 
 
Overall, the literature suggests a strong likelihood that hearers give favourable ratings to speakers who 
over-inform when (i) the discourse context is complex, (ii) the relevant property is salient, or (iii) the 
instructions given bias them to do so. The constraints favouring over-informativeness vary in origin and 
orientation: the principle of distant responsibility and the maxim of Manner are pragmatic norms of 
conversation and hearer-oriented in nature, whereas the salience constraint is perceptual and most 
likely speaker-oriented. Critically, it is not clear whether the lack of a penalty for the over-informative 
utterances in Engelhardt et al.’s off-line study reflects a lack of sensitivity to over-informativeness (as 
the authors claim) or an actual preference/tolerance for over-informativeness when these factors are at 
play. The former explanation denies the effect of Gricean maxims in comprehension, whereas the latter 
argues that these aspects of Gricean reasoning are present but overruled by other constraints, either 
Gricean in nature (minimise ambiguity), non-Gricean and perceptual (salience) or purely circumstantial 
(bias in instructions). 
 
Experiments 1--3 in this paper were designed to address these issues. The first two experiments follow 
a ratings methodology and probe participants’ comprehension by manipulating the factors which may 
have led participants to prefer over-informative utterances in Engelhardt et al.’s study. Experiment 3 
measures rates of informativeness in the production of REs, using similar stimuli to those used in 
experiment 2. 
 
The experiments also inform the overarching question about the role of Gricean pragmatics in sentence 
processing. The major positions are discussed in section  6 on future research directions, but can be 
summarised as: (i) pragmatics is the main constraint in sentence processing, (ii) pragmatics is a 
theoretical abstraction and plays no part in sentence processing, and (iii) pragmatics is one constraint 
amongst others on processing. Whereas Engelhardt et al. argue for (ii) with respect to Q-2, a review of 
the sentence processing literature on Q-1 leads us to support (iii) at this point. If the experiments 
provide further support in this direction, then research can continue towards the goal of establishing a 
ranked list of constraints involved in sentence processing, including Gricean-pragmatic and nonlinguistic 
factors. 
 
 
2. Experiment 1: sensitivity to informativeness violations: replication of  Engelhardt et al. (2006) 
 
Experiment 1 aims to replicate the findings of Engelhardt at al.’s experiment 2b in order to provide a 
comparable baseline measure of informativeness sensitivity in a complex referential context, for 
comparison with the simpler contexts which feature in experiment 2. As in Engelhardt et al.’s study, 
subjects used a 5-point rating scale to judge spoken utterances alongside a visual context depicting a 
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static scene before and after a change had taken place. Reaction time data (which were not collected in 
Engelhardt et al.’s study) were also gathered for the ratings. Assuming that processing infelicitous 
utterances is more costly than processing optimal ones, longer latencies are predicted for the under- 
and over-informative utterances than for the pragmatically optimal items. The only significant 
modification of the original methodology is in the wording of the instructions and ratings criteria. In the 
original experiment, participants were asked to rate the utterances on a scale of correctness. For the 
reasons discussed in section  1.2, the new instructions ask participants to rate each utterance according 
to ‘how naturally’ it described the change from the first to the second scene. Ratings according to 
naturalness should encompass both semantic and pragmatic violations (cf. the solely semantic 
judgement induced by ‘correct’ in Engelhardt et al.’s experiment). This criterion also does not induce 
the expectation that more information warrants higher ratings (as ‘could not be better’ is likely to have 
done), and is appropriate for both our experimental and the syntactically erroneous filler items. 
 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
24 university students participated in the experiment (mean age 20 years; 5 males and 19 females). All 
were native speakers of English and did not participate in experiments 2 and 3. 
 
2.1.2. Design 
Following  Engelhardt et al. (2006), the experiment comprised a 2 (number of referents) 2 (modification) 
2 (destination) design, giving rise to eight conditions (see  Table 1). Visual displays contained either one 
or two possible target referents, the instruction type either contained a postnominal prepositional 
phrase modifier or did not, and the destination type either matched or did not match the location-
object on which the target originally rested. All variables were manipulated within subjects, but number 
of referents was a between-items variable and the other two variables were within-item. There was no 
theoretical motivation for including destination type as a factor in the current design, as it was not 
significant in Engelhardt et al.’s study; it was included merely to make the design of the replication as 
similar as possible to the original experiment. 
 
Two lists were created. Items were rotated by instruction type (modified/unmodified), i.e. each visual 
display appeared in both a modified and an unmodified version, paired as felicitous-infelicitous 
conditions. Lists were used between subject groups, randomly allocated (see  Appendix 1 for full lists). 
 
2.1.3. Materials and procedure 
The visual stimuli consisted of photographs of scenes before and after a change had taken place, 
presented side by side on a computer screen (see  Fig. 1a and b for example arrays). The photographs 
were taken specially for the experiment. A full list of items can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
The left panel shows the scene before and the right panel shows the scene after the change has taken 
place. Associated utterances were ‘Put the peg on the other glove’ (optimal-1 condition) and ‘Put the 
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peg on the glove on the other glove’ (over-informative condition). 
 
Again, the left panel shows the scene before and the right panel shows the scene after the change has 
taken place. Associated utterances were ‘Put the button on the sock’ (under-informative condition) and 
‘Put the button on the sponge on the sock’ (optimal-2 condition). 
 
Novel audio stimuli were created using the method described by Engelhardt et al. The sound files were 
recorded by the native-speaker experimenter. The unmodified instructions were created by digitally 
removing the modifier from modified instructions using Praat speech synthesis software (Boersma and 
Weenink, 2010). For example, a sound file was created containing the instruction ‘put the button on the 
sponge on the sock’, forming a modified utterance which was optimal for a 2-referent display (as in  Fig. 
1b) and over-informative for a 1-referent display. The same file then had the PP ‘on the sponge’ 
removed, forming the unmodified counterpart for the same visual stimuli: under-informative for a 2-
referent display and optimal for a 1-referent display. The creation of these utterances ensured that 
unmodified items for both matching and different destinations had similar prosody, thus avoiding 
prosodic cues which could affect ratings of the sound stimuli. 
 
The experiment was programmed using SuperLab 4.5 experimental software. Auditory stimuli were 
played through headphones and responses were made using a USB response pad with five active 
buttons. Participants completed the experiment on a laptop in a purpose-designed testing suite with 
the experimenter in an adjacent room. 
 
Before the experiment began, participants sequentially saw isolated images of all of the objects that 
would be used in the experiment, and simultaneously heard the noun phrase (NP) that would be used 
for each, e.g. ‘button’. This phase familiarised the participants with the specific label to be used for each 
item. This manipulation of the original design was intended to ensure that neither the choice of lexical 
item nor any difficulty in recognising the objects would influence ratings and RTs. Participants then read 
the instructions for the experiment, including details of the ratings scale. They were instructed to rate 
the spoken command for its naturalness within the visual context on a scale of 1--5, where 1 
represented a very unnatural command for the visual context, 3 was neither natural nor unnatural, and 
5 was a very natural command for the context. 
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Fig. 1. (a) Experiment 1: example visual stimulus (1-referent conditions: item C05). (b) Experiment 1: example 
visual stimulus (2-referent conditions: item C22). 
 
Each trial began with a fixation cross displayed for 1000 ms, followed by the visual display which was 
shown for 2000 ms before the utterance began. The display remained on the screen throughout the 
audio stimulus and until the participant responded. RTs were recorded, monitoring latencies between 
the offset of the spoken utterance and the onset of the participants’ response. The order of trials was 
randomly assigned for each participant and participants were tested individually. The experiment took 
around 15 min to complete. 
 
Each participant completed ten randomised practice trials exemplifying each of the control and critical 
conditions which followed in the experiment. There were 72 trials in the session, consisting of 24 critical 
trials with 3 in each condition (see  Table 1 for the factors within each condition) and 48 control trials 
(which also functioned as fillers to disguise the focus on informativeness). In line with the original 
design, half of all trials were ‘good’ and half were ‘bad’. The bad trials each involved a clear violation of 
expectations, where the description was semantically false (mentioning an erroneous object), or 
pragmatically under-informative. Full stimulus lists can be found in  Appendix 1. 
 
 
2.2. Results 
 
2.2.1. Ratings 
Results of experiment 1 (ratings) are shown in  Table 1. Although the discontinuous nature of the 1--5 
ratings scale typically requires nonparametric statistical analyses, parametric statistics are used in line 
with Engelhardt et al’s analysis. 
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Table 1 
Experiment 1: conditions and mean ratings (standard error of the mean). 
 
 1-Referent  2-Referent  
 Matching destination Different destination Matching destination Different destination 
 Over-informative Over-informative Optimal-2 Optimal-2 
Modified 4.23 (.19) 3.98 (.16) 4.37 (.17) 4.14 (.20) 
 Optimal-1 Optimal-1 Under-informative Under-informative 
Unmodified 4.72 (.10) 4.70 (.10) 3.52 (.21) 3.04 (.15) 
 
The result of a 2 x  2 x  2 repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of number of referents, with 
higher ratings in favour of 1-referent contexts, F1(1,23) = 56.82, p < .0012, and a main effect of 
destination, with higher ratings in favour of matching contexts, F1(1,23) = 11.18, p < .005. Crucially, 
there was an interaction of number of referents and modification, F1(1,23) = 46.48, p < .001. No other 
interactions were found to be significant. 
Since there is no interaction between destination and either of the other factors, the matching and 
different conditions are collapsed in the subsequent analysis resulting in a 2 x 2 analysis crossing 
number of referents by modification. The resulting four conditions are: over-informative (1-referent, 
modified), under-informative (2-referents, unmodified), and two optimal conditions: optimal-1 (1-
referent, unmodified) and optimal-2 (2-referents, modified). Pairwise analyses now allow us directly to 
compare the penalties for straightforwardly under-informative and over-informative utterances. 
Ratings for the four experimental conditions plus the two control conditions are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Further pairwise planned comparisons by means of t-tests were conducted with a Bonferroni correction 
applied, These comparisons reveal that over-informative utterances (M = 4.10, SE = .16) were rated 
significantly lower than their optimal-1 counterparts (M = 4.71, SE = .09), t1(23) = 4.19, p < .001. Under-
informative utterances (M = 3.28, SE = .15) were rated significantly lower than their optimal-2 
counterparts (M = 4.26, SE = .17), t1(23) = 4.59, p < .001. Comparing the two modified instruction 
conditions (over-informative vs. optimal-2) revealed no significant differences. However, comparing the 
two unmodified conditions revealed that under-informative utterances were rated lower than optimal-
1 utterances, t1(23) = 8.43, p < .001. When comparing by infelicity type, results show that under-
informative utterances were rated significantly lower than over-informative utterances, t1(23) = 4.32, p 
< .001. 
 
Post hoc analyses between the controls and the infelicitous conditions reveal that the semantically true 
controls (M = 4.71, SE = .07) were rated significantly higher than both the under-informative, t1(23) = 
9.10, p < .001, and the over-informative utterances, t1(23) = 4.34, p < .001. The semantically false 
controls (M = 1.53, SE = .08) were rated significantly lower than both the under-informative utterances, 
                                                          
2
 By-items statistics are not reported since item variability was controlled in each experiment by counterbalancing 
lists across groups of participants (Raaijmakers et al., 1999). 
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t1(23) = 9.79, p < .001, and the over-informative utterances, t1(23) = 13.85, p < .001. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: mean ratings (matching/different conditions collapsed). Error bars show standard error of the 
mean. 
 
2.2.2. Reaction times 
Mean RTs by condition are presented in  Fig. 3. Latencies were measured from the offset of the verbal 
instruction to the participant’s response. Any RTs longer than two standard deviations above participant 
means were discarded. There were no RTs lower than 2SDs below participant means for any participant, 
but those lower than 100 ms were also discarded. Altogether, 99 of the 1728 RT data points were 
discarded (6%). By condition, these were 25/432 for semantically true control items, 42/720 for 
semantically false control items, 2/144 for optimal-1 items, 11/144 for optimal-2 items, 4/144 for over-
informative items, and 15/144 for under-informative items. Mean latencies for each condition were 
then calculated, and are shown in Fig. 3. As in the analysis of ratings, the matching and different 
conditions are collapsed, resulting in a 2 2 design. 
 
A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA for the four critical conditions reveals a main effect of number of 
referents, F1 (1,23) = 19.31, p < .001, a main effect of modification F1(1, 23) = 7.50, p < .05, and a 
significant interaction between number of referents and modification F1(1, 23) = 9.24, p < .01. 
 
Further pairwise planned comparisons by means of t-tests were conducted with a Bonferroni correction 
applied. There were no significant differences in RTs between over-informative utterances (M = 1890, 
SE = 216) and their optimal-1 counterparts (M = 1907, SE = 145). Under-informative utterances (M = 
2829, SE = 268) elicited significantly longer RTs than their optimal-2 counterparts (M = 2033, SE = 182), 
t1(23) = 4.07, p < .001. Comparing the two modified instruction conditions (over-informative vs. 
optimal-2) revealed no significant differences, but comparing the two unmodified conditions revealed 
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that under-informative utterances yielded longer reaction times than optimal-1 utterances, t1(23) = 
4.95, p < .001. When comparing by infelicity type, under-informative utterances elicited significantly 
longer RTs than over-informative utterances, t1(23) = 4.42, p < .001. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Experiment 1: mean reaction times (matching/different conditions collapsed). Error bars show standard 
error of the mean. 
Post hoc analyses reveal that the true controls (M = 1370, SE = 109) elicited significantly shorter RTs 
than the under-informative items, t1(23) = 7.04, p < .001, and the over-informative items, t1(23) = 2.64, 
p < .05. The false controls (M = 2065, SE = 208) elicited significantly shorter RTs than the under-
informative items, t1(23) = 4.41, p < .001. There were no significant differences between the false 
controls and the over-informative items. 
Overall there is a symmetry between the ratings and the reaction time measures: those conditions 
which received lower ratings also yielded longer reaction times. The exception is the false control items, 
which were rated lower than both types of pragmatically infelicitous items, but were responded to 
faster than the under-informative items and comparably to the over-informative items. This may be due 
to the clearly dispreferred nature of the semantically false controls, relative to the more subtle 
pragmatic violations. 
 
 
2.3. Discussion 
 
While our rating results accord with Engelhardt et al.’s results for sensitivity to under-informativeness, 
experiment 1 yields the novel finding that over-informative utterances are rated significantly lower in 
naturalness than their optimal-1 counterparts. In line with  Engelhardt et al.’s (2006) experiment 2, 
experiment 1 obtained significantly lower ratings for under-informative utterances compared to 
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pragmatically optimal utterances. RTs for under-informative items were also significantly slower than 
for the optimal items. This is good evidence that hearers are indeed sensitive to under-informativeness. 
As well as contravening expectations of full informativeness, the latency for the under-informative item 
may be partly due to a process of elimination. Recall that the display shows, e.g. a button on a sponge 
and a button not on a sponge, and the utterance instructs to ‘put the button on the sponge’. In this 
case, the hearer would need to rule out the button which already fulfils the instruction. We argue that 
this process, if it occurs, is still Gricean, albeit related to the maxim of Relation rather than Quantity. 
That said, we maintain that the elimination process is not the whole story: some consideration of what 
would be felicitous (i.e. describing a novel and relevant situation) precedes it. 
 
Also in line with Engelhardt et al., numerically lower ratings were obtained for over-informative 
utterances as compared to their optimal counterparts, one-referent unmodified utterances (4.3 vs. 4.6 
in Engelhardt et al.’s study; 4.1 vs. 4.7 in the current study). However in the present experiment, unlike 
theirs, this difference reached significance, suggesting sensitivity to Q-2. 
 
Nevertheless, comparing the two modified instruction conditions (over-informative vs. optimal-2) 
revealed no significant differences. This suggests that the significant interaction may be driven by the 
short instructions yielding some leniency towards over-informativeness in this design. Furthermore, 
there were no significant differences in reaction times between over-informative utterances and either 
of their optimal counterparts. Therefore the evidence for a penalty towards over-informativeness is not 
yet robust -- certainly not as robust as the evidence that was obtained for under-informative 
utterances, which were both penalised and slower relative to the optimal utterances, as well as to the 
over-informative ones. The difference between the two types of informativeness violation was 
expected, since they give rise to different kinds of communicative failure in the referential 
communication paradigm. 
 
Although we do not have unequivocal evidence in favour of sensitivity to Q-2, the new ratings scale 
provides a greater indication that participants are sensitive to over-informativeness. As argued in 
section  1.2, the lack of a robust penalty for over-informative utterances using these materials may not 
reflect a lack of sensitivity, but rather may indicate a preference for additional information in conditions 
where it is motivated. To disentangle preference from lack of sensitivity, truly gratuitously over-
informative utterances are required. These can be created by simplifying the visual display and 
removing any complexity-related preference for over-informativeness. If ratings and reaction times for 
over-informative utterances and optimal utterances do not show unequivocal differences in such a 
design, then there would indeed be evidence for a lack of sensitivity to informativeness. Another 
related possibility is that pragmatic considerations can only exert an effect when they are allocated 
sufficient processing resources. These two considerations motivate experiment 2 which uses a simple 
referential world to remove the contextual motivation for over-informativeness and to free up 
resources for potential Gricean reasoning. 
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3. Experiment 2: sensitivity to informativeness violations with prenominal modification 
 
Experiment 2 tests sensitivity to informativeness using simplified stimuli. This attempts to reduce the 
complexity and visual salience issues which may have influenced the ratings and RTs for over-
informative utterances in experiment 1 and in Engelhardt et al.’s 2006 study. Task demands are 
reduced, since participants only have to process a single display rather than considering the difference 
between two, and the displays show a somewhat simpler visual world. Should sensitivity to Q-2 be 
demonstrated, through lower ratings and longer RTs for over-informative than for optimal utterances, 
this would suggest (together with the established Q-1 penalties) that interlocutors are sensitive to both 
Gricean maxims of Quantity, and that these operate alongside referential constraints. 
 
The auditory stimuli in experiment 2 contain NPs modified with prenominal adjectives rather than with 
postnominal PPs as in experiment 1. While the latter are ambiguous (modifier of the noun or 
destination of the movement), the syntactic role of prenominal adjectives is unambiguous. The visual 
stimuli are simpler than those used in experiment 1, comprising four single objects, rather than 
compositional objects-on-objects. The movement-to-destination component was also removed. The 
fundamental 2 2 design of experiment 1 was maintained, and participants were again tested for their 
sensitivity to violations of informativeness. 
 
3.1. Pretesting for default descriptions 
 
A pre-test was performed on potential stimuli, in which items showing attributes from several 
dimensions, including scalar and absolute contrasts (e.g. size, material), were presented in isolation on-
screen. English-speaking adult participants (n = 31) described each item in response to the written 
prompt ‘What’s this?’ Items which were frequently referred to using an unmodified NP in the pre-test 
were added to the stimulus lists for subsequent use, and those attracting modification in more than 
60% of elicited REs were discarded. This was done to rule out penalisation on the grounds that the 
particular stimulus possessed such a salient attribute that it would seem marked to omit it, even when 
appearing in isolation (cf. Karmiloff-Smith’s descriptor/determinor functions;  1979:45). For example, 
one of the discarded images depicted a broken cup for which 88% of the elicited REs included the 
modifier ‘broken’. The pre-test helps ensure that the stimuli in experiments 2 and 3 are likely to have an 
unmodified default description, which means that hearers should not have strong expectations about 
the use of an adjective. 
 
3.2. Method 
 
3.2.1. Participants 
24 university students participated in the experiment (mean age 25 years; 6 males and 18 females). All 
were native speakers of English and did not participate in experiments 1 and 3. 
 
3.2.1.1. Design.  
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Experiment 2 had a 2 (number of referents) 2 (presence of adjectival modification) within-subjects 
design, creating four conditions: over-informative (1-referent, modified), under-informative (2-referent, 
unmodified) and two optimal conditions; optimal-1 (1-referent, unmodified) and optimal-2 (2-referent, 
modified). These are illustrated in  Fig. 4a-d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. (a--d) Experiment 2: example stimuli. 
 
3.2.2. Materials and procedure 
The experiment was programmed using SuperLab 4.5 experimental software. A static display on a 
computer screen showed two characters, one of whom had four items in her vicinity. In these simple 
arrays where there is at most one contrasting item of the same category as the target, participants 
must expend little effort deciding whether an attribute is minimally contrastive or not, and so should 
have sufficient resources to make this calculation and then make their rating. Participants heard the 
speaker-character asking the hearer-character to ‘pass me the [referring expression]’ on pre-recorded 
sound files, and then were asked to rate how natural the instruction was in the visual context using a 5-
point scale. Responses were made using a USB response pad with five active buttons, with 1 signifying a 
‘very unnatural’ utterance and 5 signifying ‘very natural’. Participants completed the experiment in a 
purpose-designed testing suite with the experimenter in an adjacent room. The experiment took 
around 15 min to complete, and formed part of an hour-long testing session containing unrelated 
experiments. 
 
There were 40 critical items, 10 in each condition, plus 20 syntactically infelicitous items, e.g. ‘pass me 
the cup plastic’. These control items were included to ensure that participants were able to penalise 
straightforwardly inappropriate utterances (see  Appendix 2 for a sample list of items). Items were 
randomly presented and the position of the target referent and the contrasting referent was rotated 
between items in all conditions. A Latin square design was used to counterbalance item effects: every 
target item appeared in only one of the four conditions for a given participant. The same syntactically 
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infelicitous items were used across versions. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
3.3.1. Ratings 
The mean ratings (n = 24) for the four experimental conditions together with those for the syntactically 
infelicitous controls are presented in  Fig. 5. As no comparison is made with the rating study of 
Engelhardt et al. (2006), non-parametric statistics appropriate to the discrete Likert scales are now 
used. 
 
Friedman’s ANOVAs for nonparametric data revealed a significant difference between critical 
conditions, x21(3) = 41.41, p < .001. Further pairwise planned comparisons were conducted using 
Wilcoxon signed-rank Tests with a Bonferroni correction applied. Comparing the two 1-referent 
conditions revealed that the over-informative utterances (M = 3.95, SE = .15) were rated lower than 
optimal-1 utterances (M = 4.87, SE = .04), Z1 = 4.20, p < .001. Likewise, comparing the two 2-referent 
conditions revealed that the under-informative utterances (M = 3.51, SE = .19) were rated lower than 
optimal-2 utterances (M = 4.70, SE = .07), Z1 = 3.82, p < .001. Comparing the two modified instruction 
conditions also yielded significant differences: over-informative utterances were rated lower than 
optimal-2 utterances, Z1 = 3.73, p < .001, and comparing the two unmodified conditions revealed that 
under-informative utterances were rated lower than optimal-1 utterances, Z1 = 4.11, p < .001. 
Comparing by infelicity type, under-informative utterances were rated lower than over-informative 
utterances, Z1 = 2.71, p < .01. There were no significant differences between the two optimal 
conditions. 
 
Post hoc analyses reveal that ratings for the syntactically violated controls (M = 1.69, SE = .10) were 
significantly lower than those for both the under-informative items, Z1 = 4.06, p < .001, and the over-
informative items, Z1 = 4.23, p < .001.
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Fig. 5. Experiment 2: mean ratings. Error bars show standard error of the mean. 
 
3.3.2. Reaction times 
Mean RTs by condition are presented in  Fig. 6. Latencies were measured from the offset of the verbal 
instruction to the participants’ responses. Any RTs longer than 2 SDs above participant means were 
discarded. There were no RTs lower than 2SDs below means for any participant, but those lower than 
100 ms were also discarded. In total, 147 of the 1440 RT data points were discarded (10%): 43/480 
responses to the control items, 13/240 in the optimal-1 condition, 37/240 in the optimal-2 condition 
and 28/240 in the over-informative condition. Mean latencies for each condition were then computed. 
 
A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA for the four critical conditions reveals no main effect of number of 
referents or of modification. There was however a highly significant interaction between number of 
referents and modification, F1(1, 23) = 21.85, p < .001. 
 
Further pairwise planned comparisons were conducted by means of t-tests with a Bonferroni correction 
applied. RTs were longer for the over-informative utterances (M = 1421, SE = 128) than for optimal-1 
utterances (M = 929, SE = 88), t1(23) = 5.18, p < .001. RTs were longer for the under-informative 
utterances (M = 1320, SE = 117) than for optimal-2 utterances (M = 968, SE = 121), marginally 
significant at t1(23) = 2.45, p = .02. A similar pattern holds for the by-modification comparisons: RTs 
were longer for over-informative than for optimal-2 utterances, t1(23) = 4.89, p < .001, and longer for 
under-informative than for the optimal-1 utterances, t1(23) = 3.28, p < .005. RTs were not significantly 
different for under-informative and over-informative utterances, nor for optimal-1 and optimal-2 
utterances. 
 
Post hoc analyses revealed that the syntactically infelicitous controls (M = 1194, SE = 86) elicited 
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significantly shorter RTs than the over-informative items only, t1(23) = 3.04, p < .01: the more salient 
syntactic violation attracts a quicker response, whereas the Q-2 violation is arguably more subtle and 
yields greater response latency. 
 
Note also that the mean RTs for critical conditions in experiment 2 (1162 ms) are numerically shorter 
than those in experiment 1 (2165 ms). We take this to indicate the lower task demands required for 
processing the simpler visual array, the lack of syntactic ambiguity, and the simpler modificational 
frame in experiment 2. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Experiment 2: mean reaction times. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
 
3.4. Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 revealed sensitivities to violations of both Quantity maxims: under- and over-informative 
utterances were penalised relative to optimally-informative utterances, and also elicited longer RTs. As 
in experiment 1, under-informativeness was rated significantly lower than over-informativeness, in line 
with Gricean predictions of relative lenience for violations of the second Quantity maxim, and with 
reference resolution constraints. Our results therefore suggest that in simple visual worlds, where there 
is little motivation for over-informing, hearers are sensitive to violations of Q-2. As there was minimal 
visual complexity in experiment 2, and no other entity shared the adjectival property, modification in 
the over-informative condition was straightforwardly redundant and served no clarifying function, 
unlike in Engelhardt et al’s study. While over-informative descriptions may facilitate processing in 
complex arrays (Arts, 2004; Arts et al., 2010; Mangold and Pobel, 1988), the longer RTs found in this 
experiment indicate that this does not hold in simple arrays. On the basis of these data, we tentatively 
hypothesise that the time may be spent looking for a function for the adjective. Accordingly, over-
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informative descriptions were penalised relative to both optimal conditions in this experiment (contra 
expt. 1). 
 
If interlocutors adhere to Gricean maxims in the hearer role, we should expect them also to do so in the 
speaker role (as was found in Engelhardt et al.’s expt. 1 and 2). Experiment 3 tests this prediction using 
the same stimuli as used in experiment 2. 
 
 
4. Experiment 3: production of referring expressions 
 
Experiment 2 suggests that hearers are Gricean in their expectations of informativeness in referring 
expressions. Experiment 3 seeks to document rates of under- and over-informing in production contexts 
similar to those used in experiment 2. 
 
Previous studies using the referential communication paradigm document reasonably high (though 
variable) rates of over-informing in production.  Pechmann (1989) found that 21% of adults’ expressions 
in a referential task contained redundant descriptions, i.e. attribute(s) of the intended referent that 
were not necessary for unique identification.  Engelhardt  et al. (2006) found that 30% of the REs in 
their production study were over-informative, and  Viethen and Dale (2006) recorded 25% of their 
participants’ REs as redundant. In all three studies, the referential arrays were more complex than those 
used in the current experiment, containing more objects in a single array, and more dimensions along 
which the target and competitor objects varied. Complexity stemming from (i) numbers of objects, (ii) 
their compositional nature, and (iii) the presence of identical destinations may have motivated over-
informing in  Engelhardt et al.’s work (2006), as discussed in section  1.2. 
 
These representative studies suggest that around a quarter of REs are over-informative, and that 
speakers commonly give more information than is minimally required. It is much less common for 
speakers to under-inform, i.e. to give less information than is required to identify an entity ( Engelhardt 
et al., 2006; expt. 1). However, the factors in this experiment that favoured over-informativeness (see 
experiments 1 and 2) may bias speakers as well as hearers. Experiment 3 examines whether speakers 
and hearers are matched in rates of informativeness, using the simple referential array from experiment 
2. As in the comprehension experiment, it is anticipated that the simplicity of the arrays will lead to 
lower rates of over-informing, as participants can easily complete a full scan of the array before 
articulating their RE. 
 
4.1. Method 
 
4.1.1. Participants 
24 university students participated in the experiment (mean age 26 years; 13 males and 11 females). All 
were native speakers of English and did not participate in experiments 1 and 2. 
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4.1.2. Design 
Experiment 3 used a repeated measures design, where presence/absence of a contrast set was 
manipulated. Speakers saw visual stimuli containing either one or two referents of the same type, 
accompanied by either two (2-referent condition) or three (1-referent condition) non-referents. See  
Fig. 7a and b for sample arrays. 
 
4.1.3. Materials and procedure 
The visual stimuli were similar to those used in experiment 2. Forty arrays were created, each in two 
versions; a 1-referent display (no contrast set), and a 2-referent display (contrast set). Half of the 
participants saw the first group of items in the 1-referent display and the second group of items in the 
2-referent display, while this was reversed for the other participants. See  Appendix 3 for a sample list 
of items. The order of items within each group was randomised and the relative position of the target 
referent and the contrasting referent was rotated between items. There were two practice items at the 
beginning of the experiment, exemplifying each of the two conditions. 
 
Participants were presented with the stimuli via a static laptop display using Microsoft PowerPoint 
software and were asked to instruct an on-screen hearer (depicted by a photograph) to ‘pass one of 
these objects in a way that he would easily understand’. They were told that the on-screen items were 
visible both to themselves and the on-screen hearer. The target items were cued in a separate physical 
booklet visible only to the participant, which showed the same displays as those on-screen but with the 
target item (one per array) highlighted by an arrow. The participants were instructed to proceed by 
advancing the visual display to the next slide using the laptop keyboard, inspecting the complete visual 
array, and then turning the page in their booklet to reveal the identity of the target and requesting that 
object. The task was administered in a purpose-designed testing suite by a single experimenter who 
stayed in an adjacent room after the instructions and practice items were successfully completed. The 
participants were tested individually. Their responses were voice-recorded and later transcribed and 
coded. The production study took around 5 min to administer, and formed part of a longer 
experimental session involving additional experiments for unrelated research projects. 
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Fig. 7. (a and b) Experiment 3: sample on-screen visual stimuli. The target item was cued in a separate booklet 
given to the participants (2nd item from the left in this case in both illustrated items). 
 
4.1.4. Coding the responses 
All responses were recorded, transcribed and classified as under-informative, optimally informative or 
over-informative depending on the visual display. For example, in the array depicted in  Fig. 7a, an 
optimally informative expression would be ‘pass me the bag’, and an over-informative expression would 
be ‘pass me the closed bag’ or ‘pass me the leather bag’. ‘Pass me the bag’ would be under-informative 
in  Fig. 7b, with e.g. ‘pass me the closed bag’ coded as optimal and ‘pass me the closed leather bag’ as 
over-informative. The over-informative expressions were coded for the type of attribute used, and the 
modified expressions were also coded for syntactic form, e.g. comparative or postnominal modification. 
 
4.2. Results 
 
4.2.1. Quantitative analysis 
The proportions of under-informative, optimal, and over-informative referring expressions for 1-
referent and 2-referent arrays are presented in  Fig. 8. 
 
With regard to the 1-referent displays, where only two types of RE were documented (optimal and 
over-informative, M = 18.08 (max frequency 20), SE = .42 and M = 1.92, SE = .42 respectively), a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for non-parametric data revealed a significant difference between optimal 
and over-informative descriptions, Z1 = 4.31, p < 0.001. With regard to the 2-referent displays, where 
under-, optimal-, and over-informative expressions were elicited; M = .63, SE = .20; M = 17.92, SE = .36; 
M = 1.46, SE = .34, respectively, a Friedman’s ANOVA for non-parametric data revealed a significant 
difference between conditions, Z1 (x2(2) = 39.06, p < .001). Still with the 2-referent displays, further 
pairwise comparisons by means of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed significant differences between 
under- and optimally-informative utterances, Z1 = 4.30, p < .001, and optimal and over-informative 
utterances, Z1 = 4.30. p < .001. Rates of under- and over-informative utterances in the 2-referent 
displays were not significantly different. 
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Overall, in displays both with and without a contrast set, speakers used a minimally contrastive 
referring strategy in around 90% of their REs, i.e. they were highly optimal. In the 2-referent condition, 
where both under- and over-informative expressions were documented, the rates of occurrence of 
these expressions did not significantly differ. Rates of optimal-and over-informativeness were similar 
across both types of displays, despite over-informative utterances requiring at least one adjective in the 
1-referent condition and at least two in the 2-referent. Unsurprisingly, under-informativeness was 
attested only in the 2-referent condition, since under-informativeness in the 1-referent condition would 
involve omitting the noun. Crucially, rates of over-informativeness (which averaged out to 8.4% across 
both conditions) were lower than the rates of 30% reported by  Engelhardt et al. (2006, expt. 1). 
 
Results show that in a simple visual world, speakers do not often produce over-informative expressions, 
which parallels the results from experiment2 showing that hearers are sensitive to this type of speaker 
behaviour. In both the speaker and the hearer role, interlocutors appear to be sensitive to violations of 
both Quantity maxims. This is evidence that interlocutors are aware of expectations of informativeness 
other than those minimally required to achieve reference resolution? 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Experiment 3 results: production of under-, optimal, and over-informative referring expressions. 
 
 
4.3. Qualitative analysis of the over-informative expressions 
 
The 81 tokens of overspecified reference that were elicited from 960 REs were analysed for type. Of 
these overspecified tokens, the attribute most frequently provided redundantly was colour (54%), 
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followed by size (20%), material (8%), and on-screen location (5%). The remaining 13% of overspecified 
tokens were coded as ‘other’ and included salient attributes such as ‘desktop’ in relation to a singleton 
computer, ‘cordless’ for a singleton phone and ‘sleeping’ for a singleton baby. The results regarding the 
colour over-modification accord with previous work which suggests that colour attributes are 
commonly used redundantly as well as contrastively (Eikmeyer and Ahlsen, 1998;  Mangold and Pobel, 
1988; Pechmann, 1989; Rubio-Fernández and Glucksberg, 2010; Schriefers and Pechmann, 1988;  Weiss 
and Mangold, 1997). In particular,  Sedivy (2002) found that colour modifiers are frequently encoded in 
default descriptions, probably due to their visual salience and absolute (rather than scalar) nature3. This 
suggests that at least some of the attested over-informativeness could be attributed to a nonlinguistic 
constraint, the salience of colour, overriding pragmatic considerations, rather than to a general lack of 
sensitivity to pragmatic maxims. 
 
The form of optimal REs was also coded for the 2-referent condition (in which modification was 
required). The most frequent syntactic pattern (83%) was prenominal modification (all of the items 
allowed attributive use, e.g. ‘the big star’, ‘the unsliced bread’). However, the data revealed three 
further trends in the form of modification. 8% of optimal utterances were comparative, e.g. ‘the larger 
of the two vases’, ‘the more modern phone’. 4% of optimal utterances were appositively modified as in 
‘the glass, the full one’ and ‘the phone, the new phone’. A further 4% were modified using relative 
clauses such as ‘the briefcase that’s shut’ and ‘the rug that’s got tassels’. The postnominal character of 
the latter two forms suggests that REs were initiated before the visual scan of the array was complete 
and so utterance planning and visual scanning took place simultaneously (Pechmann, 1989). The use of 
comparative expressions reveals that the participants were actively contrasting the target items with 
the contrast-mate. 
 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 
Simplifying the visual array removes motivation for over-informing, as documented by the high rates of 
optimality and relatively low rates of over-informing in the referring expressions elicited in experiment 
3. As discussed above, previous experiments using more complex displays have documented higher 
rates of over-informing, allowing us to reconcile the current results from the simplified stimuli with 
previous patterns in the literature. 
 
In addition to differences in referent numbers/dimensions between the current study and its 
forerunners, differences in procedure are likely to have impacted upon the amount of detail given in 
REs. In work comparing referring expressions and visual scanning processes (Eikmeyer and Ahlsen, 
1998; Pechmann, 1989), overspecifications are cast as by-products of incremental on-line processes 
wherein REs are encoded at the same time as scanning the visual array. Appositively modified items in 
                                                          
3
 Relatedly, in comprehension, colour modification does not trigger contrastive inference, at least for objects 
with predictable colour modification ( Sedivy, 2003). 
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our data lend support for the occurrence of such processing. The current procedure differed from 
previous studies in that the participants completed a full scan of the array before the target was 
revealed to them. This means that if participants anticipated the target to be one member of the 
contrast set (which could have been learned over the course of the experiment), they had time to 
identify the distinguishing feature of the contrast set in the 2-referent displays and to plan their 
expression accordingly. This forced separation of difference-detection and articulation could account 
for the relatively low rates of over-informing in the data, relative to studies that have elicited 
incremental, naturalistic REs. However, a comparison with a similar production experiment which did 
not separate difference-detection and articulation (Davies and Katsos, 2010, expt. 1) reveals relatively 
stable rates of overinforming: 6% in  Davies and Katsos (2010) versus 8% in the new experiment (1- and 
2-referent conditions combined). Moreover, the new data contained some postnominal modifications 
for which articulation may have started before the speakers identified the distinguishing feature: these 
constituted 8% of the optimal expressions in the 2-referent condition. 
 
Production results from experiment 3 suggest that, when arrays are simple and speakers are given time 
to plan their REs, they produce highly optimal utterances. This load/efficiency trade-off reveals a 
substantial cognitive component in object reference. However, pragmatic processes are also at work. 
The hearer-character in the current experiment was deemed to be unaware of the identity of the target 
referent until the speaker-participant specified it. Consequently, the participant was responsible for 
providing a cooperative utterance, i.e. one which conformed to Gricean expectations of minimal 
informativeness. Furthermore, the hearer in experiment 3 was clearly not a live interlocutor: there 
remains the possibility that using a live confederate might increase the incidence of redundancy in 
referring expressions. The different rates of optimal productions in the current study compared to 
previous work do not rule out Gricean pragmatic requirements as a constraint on language production 
and comprehension. It is possible that when situations are complex, or when aspects of the referent are 
salient, speakers build in extra redundancy (as some hearer-oriented realisation of the maxim of 
Manner for the former, or due to a speaker-oriented effect for the latter). When arrays are simple and 
speakers have time to plan efficient utterances, they adhere more strictly to Quantity-2. 
 
 
5. General discussion 
 
The experiments reported provide support for the reality of interlocutors’ sensitivity to both Gricean 
maxims of Quantity and thus for Gricean expectations to be considered as a constraint on sentence 
processing. 
 
In summary, experiment 1 provides tentative evidence for hearers’ sensitivity to Q-2 and replicates the 
robust sensitivity to Q-1 that had been found previously (Engelhardt et al., 2006). Experiment 2 
unequivocally documents sensitivity to Q-2, as reflected both by ratings and reaction time data, in 
simplified worlds devoid of extraneous motivation for over-informing. This strongly suggests the 
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operation of both Q-1 and Q-2 constraints in sentence comprehension. It is important to point out that 
‘pragmatics’ should not be seen as a unitary concept: Gricean maxims have variable influence, as shown 
by stronger sensitivity to Q-1 than Q-2 throughout the experiments, which relates to the need to 
establish reference. Experiment 3 documents that speakers show the same pattern of sensitivity as 
found in experiment 2, i.e. they tend not to under- or over-inform in their production of REs. This adds 
weight to the argument for the psychological reality of Quantity-based pragmatic constraints in 
sentence processing across speaker and hearer roles. 
 
The current work challenges the conclusion drawn by  Engelhardt et al. (2006:572) that speakers and 
hearers are only ‘moderately Gricean’. They argued this point on the basis that speakers produced 
many over-informative descriptions (their expt. 1) which hearers did not penalise (their expt. 2), 
whereas both speakers and hearers were much more sensitive in avoiding and penalising under-
informativeness. Engelhardt et al.’s finding that over-informative descriptions nevertheless trigger a 
penalty in on-line visual world sentence processing (their expt. 3) led them to re-analyse this penalty as 
lexical-structural rather than pragmatic in motivation. However, we argue that there are pragmatic as 
well as non-pragmatic factors at play in their experiments which may render over-informativeness 
acceptable. Engelhardt and colleagues had to reconcile discrepant data from their production and 
ratings studies with their eyetracking results. The former two studies documented low rates of and 
penalties for over-informing, while the latter elicited clear on-line penalties for the same type of 
infelicity (although recall the concern about the unification of off-line and on-line results, footnote  1). 
 
However, supposing that Engelhardt et al.’s off-line and on-line studies did tap into the same kind of 
competence, the discrepancy in the findings can still be explained. The authors were reluctant to 
interpret their eyetracking data as reflecting sensitivity to pragmatic constraints, as participants in their 
second experiment did not show sensitivity to over-informativeness in the off-line ratings, and 
participants in experiment 1 produced many over-informative descriptions. However, given the findings 
from our experiments 1--3, we suggest that it is not the results of Engelhardt et al.’s experiment 3 that 
need re-conceptualising as the outcome of non-pragmatic factors. Rather, their experiments 1 and 2 
can be re-analysed as involving situations where the pragmatic maxim of Q-2 is overridden by the 
pragmatic maxim of Manner (‘avoid ambiguity/be clear’) as well as other non-pragmatic constraints 
such as visual salience. 
 
Overall, contrary to the claim that people are only reliably sensitive to the first maxim of Quantity and 
‘only moderately Gricean’, our experiments suggest that speakers and hearers are Gricean with regard 
to both under- and over-informativeness in comprehension and production. Our results suggest that 
people can be more Gricean when task demands are sufficiently low, and that Gricean processes may 
conflict with other constraints. Several clarifications are in order. 
 
First, experiments 2 and 3 show merely that interlocutors do not expect, and avoid producing, under- 
and over-informative REs. They do not address whether the actual psycholinguistic competence 
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demonstrated is of the kind Grice envisaged, namely that interlocutors are sensitive to considerations 
of their others’ intentions and communicative relevance. It remains possible on these data that 
interlocutors establish what would be optimally informative by using some local metric of 
distinctiveness between referents, and that Gricean considerations are either theoretical 
rationalisations or, if psycholinguistically real, late-arriving metalinguistic constraints. That said, 
evidence is emerging that sensitivity to under-informativeness does indeed take into account speakers’ 
intentions (in terms of their conversational goal; see  Breheny et al., 2006). Moreover, Q-2 sensitivity is 
affected by considerations of interlocutor reliability and cooperativeness (see Grodner and Sedivy, 
2011, which demonstrates that the contrastive inference from the use of a modifying adjective 
disappears when the speaker is explicitly unreliable in the other instructions that they give). Clearly this 
is a matter for further investigation. 
 
Second, how far does the general claim hold that participants are sensitive to over-informativeness? 
Recall that sensitivity to over-informativeness was only found in experiments 2 and 3, which used pre-
modifying syntactically unambiguous adjectives (as in the work by  Sedivy et al., 1999 and  Sedivy, 2003) 
and not in experiment 1, which used temporarily ambiguous PPs (cf.  Spivey et al., 2002; Tanenhaus et 
al., 1995; Trueswell et al., 1999). The former result is sufficient evidence against Engelhardt et al.’s claim 
that participants only moderately adhere to Quantity maxims and are ‘not troubled’ when they 
encounter over-descriptions ( 2006:572). However, could it be that a more modest claim holds, namely 
that interlocutors are not sensitive to over-informativeness in cases of syntactic ambiguity? This is not 
implausible, although the burden of proof lies with the proponents of such a proposal. Given the results 
of experiment 2, we consider that there are strong reasons to believe that the lack of penalisation in 
experiment 1 is not due to a lack of sensitivity, but rather due to a preference for over-informativeness 
in certain contexts, as discussed earlier (e.g. section  1.2, paragraph 10). 
 
Third, the RT data raise questions about the nature of the delay involved in making judgements on 
infelicitous utterances. Data from the current study do not tell us whether participants were simply 
noticing the over-informativeness as distinct from concise and optimal expressions, or whether they 
were actively inferring that the speaker using the RE ‘the big star’ also has another star in mind. That is, 
the current data cannot distinguish whether the delay is due to sensitivity to a departure from the 
norm, or to the generation of a contrastive inference. This is a matter which has arisen in the under-
informativeness literature as well, especially sentence-verification studies such as  Noveck and Posada  
(2003) and  Bott and Noveck (2004). In these studies it has been found that participants are slower at 
rejecting pragmatically under-informative utterances such as ‘some elephants have trunks’. However, it 
is not possible to know from the sentence-verification paradigm whether the delay is due to the 
participants noticing that the utterance is infelicitous (the speaker said ‘some’ whereas she should have 
said ‘all’) or whether participants generated the inference that some but not all elephants have trunks. 
Investigations using the visual-world paradigm may be fruitful in further investigating this matter. 
 
Fourth, we cannot say with certainty whether the relative leniency with which hearers treat violations 
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of Q-2 to Q-1 is based on purely theoretical considerations (as Grice proposed), or due to a stronger 
intolerance of those utterances which fail to establish reference to a unique target. Disentangling these 
issues requires a study of how sensitive participants are in cases where neither violation of Q-1 nor of 
Q-2 leads to reference failure. This can be done using modifications to the paradigm used in the 
Quantity implicature literature. For example, participants could be presented with a situation in which a 
protagonist performs an action, and then hear a sentence that attempts to describe it. Occasionally, the 
sentence is under-informative (e.g. they hear that ‘the client bought the computer’ in a situation where 
the client bought both the computer and the modem) or over-informative (‘the client bought the fast 
computer’ in a situation where there was only one computer in the display). In these cases we are 
dealing with a violation of Q-1 and Q-2 respectively, which, unlike previous work, do not lead to 
reference failure. 
 
Fifth, no firm conclusions can be made at this point as to the causal relation between the lack of 
motivation for over-informing and the elicited sensitivity to Q-2. To draw such conclusions, we would 
require further studies that systematically manipulate the posited motivation for over-informing. The 
pilot experiment summarised in section  6 initiates this research strand with respect to one suggested 
reason for over-informing; future work should continue to load these factors one by one while testing 
sensitivity after each manipulation. Relevant factors might include the complexity of the array and the 
presence of ambiguity. If such a manipulation led to increased production of over-informativeness and 
decreased sensitivity to over-informing, this would constitute evidence both for the masking of Gricean 
sensitivity in Engelhardt et al.’s study and for the relative weakness of Gricean constraints compared to 
perceptual constraints in sentence processing. 
 
 
6. Future directions 
 
A remaining concern over  Engelhardt et al.’s (2006) methodology was that certain attributes in their 
visual display (including attributes of the target) were deemed more salient that others. This could have 
led speakers to encode the attribute redundantly or hearers to expect such encoding and thus not 
penalise over-informative items. If one of the item-types in an array appears more frequently than 
other item-types, it is reasonable to assume that its salience is increased. Similarly, if one of the items is 
clearly different from its array-mates, for example because it appears in a container, its salience may 
also increase. In  Engelhardt et al.’s (2006) study, target items were privileged in both these respects. 
Such configurations may play a major causal role in the production of over-informative descriptions, as 
salience would lead to increased perceptual activation of the attribute regardless of its contrastiveness. 
It is not unreasonable to further expect that in these conditions, hearers will also expect superfluous 
detail in referring expressions. 
 
Salience effects in the production of referring expressions have been demonstrated by  Carbary and  
Tanenhaus (2007), who found that in arrays in which one of the non-referents shared an attribute of 
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the target (e.g. a striped cat non-referent and a striped shirt target referent) 25% of REs to the target 
were overspecified, compared with an 11% baseline rate when non-referents shared no attributes with 
the target. The authors conclude that the salience of a particular attribute is increased by the presence 
of that attribute elsewhere in the array, increasing the likelihood of it being encoded in an over-
informative RE. We conducted a pilot production study alongside experiment 3, which used similar 
instructions but increased the salience of one of the attributes of the target referent by placing it next 
to a distractor which shared that attribute, e.g. an open bag next to an open box. The resulting REs 
exhibited a numerical difference towards increased over-informativeness, climbing from 14% in the 
baseline condition to 20% in the shared-attribute condition. This trend, coupled with Carbary and 
Tanenhaus’s (2007) findings, tentatively suggests that visual salience of an attribute may encourage 
speakers to mention a non-discriminating adjective. 
 
This finding may help account for the relatively high incidence of over-informativeness found in  
Engelhardt et al.’s  (2006) production expt. 1. Specific containers could be argued to possess increased 
salience within this paradigm, due to multiple instantiations of them in the arrays, as well as the 
compositional nature of the target + container items. Furthermore, we note that nonlinguistic features 
added to the visual display numerically affect the degree of informativeness produced. Such factors may 
be at play in the expectation of increased levels of informativeness in Engelhardt et al.’s expt. 2 and in 
our replication reported as experiment 1. The numerical trend in our pilot study suggests that factors 
identified as favouring over-informativeness (visual salience, array complexity etc.) have modest effects 
in isolation, but taken together could considerably influence levels of informativeness in referring 
expressions. Future work from both the speaker and the comprehender’s perspective should continue 
in the same spirit, testing the effect of individual factors on over-informativeness and thus contributing 
to a model of naturalistic conversation which takes these into account. 
 
In some ways, the current study raises more questions than it answers. Having established that 
speakers and hearers are sensitive to under- and over-informativeness, experiments 2 and 3 rescue 
Gricean reasoning as a candidate for the list of constraints influencing sentence processing. Where 
Gricean considerations lie relative to other constraints is still very much up for debate, but three basic 
positions can be proposed: 
 
(i) Gricean considerations are the main factor constraining the interpretation of ambiguous utterances. 
This prioritisation of Grice is projected from theoretical predictions relating to what the idealised 
interlocutor is expected to do.  
 
(ii) Gricean considerations are a philosophical abstraction. Under-informativeness only appears to 
constrain referential interpretations because it is actually a reference resolution constraint. Over-
informativeness is seldom relevant.  
 
(iii) Gricean considerations form one constraint amongst many, with their relative weight not yet tested. 
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One possibility is that Q-1 may have more weight than Q-2 due to their differential interaction with 
reference resolution constraints. In addition, if Gricean considerations have relatively little impact, 
this may be because they are only active when sufficient processing resources are available.  
 
Position (i) can be eliminated due to the wealth of research documenting manifold constraints on 
sentence processing, e.g. referential world, syntactic frequency, minimal attachment, thematic roles 
etc. Experiments 2 and 3 above provide evidence against (ii) due to their documentation of sensitivity to 
Q-2, which does not coincide with reference resolution processes. Thus position (iii) is favoured at this 
point. However, extensive work is required along the lines discussed above in order to shed light on the 
interaction of Gricean considerations with other constraints. Such research will naturally feed into a 
mechanistic account of how people use referring expressions under real conversational conditions, 
potentially involving a ranked list of constraints including Gricean and nonlinguistic factors. 
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Appendix 1. Item list for experiment 1. 
Please see published paper or contact c.n.davies@leeds.ac.uk for appendix 1. 
 
 
Appendix 2. Sample stimuli for experiment 2 (list 1 from 4) 
Item Target Distractor / Competitor Distractor Distractor Utterance: ‘Pass me X’ 
Under-informative     
under-01 long skirt short skirt football toilet the skirt 
under-02 closed bag open bag strawberry zebra the bag 
under-03 old 
newspaper 
recent newspaper cherry dog the newspaper 
under-04 short sock long sock lobster spoon the sock 
under-05 stripy cup spotty cup tv cucumber the cup 
under-06 tall vase short vase key bus the vase 
under-07 new phone old phone hat flower the phone 
under-08 small star big star house chick the star 
under-09 sleeping 
baby 
feeding baby butterfly tap the baby 
under-10 full glass empty glass iron broom the glass 
Over-informative     
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over-01 thin nail fork apple cat the thin nail 
over-02 tall boot carrot tree microphone the tall boot 
over-03 new phone bike compass feather the modern phone 
over-04 old 
computer 
watch guitar mirror the old computer 
over-05 intact egg onion camera hairdryer the unbroken egg 
over-06 closed 
umbrella 
onion ice-cream stool the closed umbrella 
over-07 open book hamburger fish teddy the open book 
over-08 unsliced 
bread 
toothbrush toad pineapple the unsliced bread 
over-09 unlit 
cigarette 
tiger plane soap the unlit cigarette 
over-10 modern rug banana crab toaster the modern rug 
Optimal + 1-referent     
opt1-01 banana cube fork watch the banana 
opt1-02 comb onion hamburger toothbrush the comb 
opt1-03 hammer apple tiger tree the hammer 
opt1-04 pear camera ice-cream guitar the pear 
opt1-05 sausage toad plane crab the sausage 
opt1-06 boat cat microphone feather the boat 
opt1-07 drum stool hairdryer teddy the drum 
opt1-08 corkscrew toaster duck soap the corkscrew 
opt1-09 flower razor anchor drum the flower 
opt1-10 onion cup fridge vase the onion 
Optimal + 2-referents     
opt2-01 tall jug short jug kettle panda the tall jug 
opt2-02 glass mug china mug duck corkscrew the glass mug 
opt2-03 adult 
penguin 
baby penguin razor lamp the adult penguin 
opt2-04 square pan round pan pear fridge the square pan 
opt2-05 fresh apple rotten apple comb sausage the fresh apple 
opt2-06 big cookie small cookie anchor hammer the big cookie 
opt2-07 big cube small cube drum vase the big cube 
opt2-08 big hat small hat shoe cube the small hat 
opt2-09 small anchor big anchor drum boat the small anchor 
opt2-10 dry stone wet stone cup door the dry stone 
Fillers      
clefts      
f1 big circle small circle cube hammer the big circle, pass me 
f2 open door closed door carrot cat the open door, pass me 
f3 cookie tree feather compass the cookie, pass me 
f4 hairdryer bike microphone mirror the hairdryer, pass me 
f5 kettle watch guitar onion the kettle, pass me 
zero 
article 
     
f6 short sock long sock camera elephant pass me short sock 
f7 big bottle small bottle fish hamburger pass me big bottle 
f8 feather ice-cream pineapple toothbrush pass me feather 
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f9 pineapple banana toilet toad pass me pineapple 
f10 onion tiger plane soap pass me onion 
adjective-noun reversal     
f11 plastic cup paper cup stool teddy pass me the cup plastic 
f12 tall jug small jug toaster strawberry pass me the jug tall 
f13 broken chair intact chair cherry crab pass me the chair broken 
f14 closed eye open eye giraffe spoon pass me the eye closed 
f15 wooden 
table 
glass table pencil candle pass me the table 
wooden 
scrambled word order     
f16 small shoe big shoe chick bus me shoe pass small the 
f17 big car small car house key me car pass big the 
f18 teddy cucumber hotdog iron me teddy pass the 
f19 soap hat tap flower me soap pass the 
f20 watch cake football dog me watch pass the 
 
Appendix 3. Sample stimuli for experiment 3 (list 1 from 2) 
Item Target Distractor/competitor 
(2-ref condition 
only) 
Distractor Distractor 
     
1-ref01 thin nail fork apple cat 
1-ref02 tall boot carrot tree microphone 
1-ref03 new phone bike compass feather 
1-ref04 old computer watch guitar mirror 
1-ref05 intact egg onion camera hairdryer 
1-ref06 closed umbrella onion ice-cream stool 
1-ref07 open book hamburger fish teddy 
1-ref08 unsliced bread toothbrush toad pineapple 
1-ref09 unlit cigarette tiger plane soap 
1-ref10 modern rug banana crab toaster 
1-ref11 banana cube fork watch 
1-ref12 comb onion hamburger toothbrush 
1-ref13 hammer apple tiger tree 
1-ref14 pear camera ice-cream guitar 
1-ref15 sausage toad plane crab 
1-ref16 boat cat microphone feather 
1-ref17 drum stool hairdryer teddy 
1-ref18 corkscrew toaster duck soap 
1-ref19 flower razor anchor drum 
1-ref20 onion cup fridge vase 
2-ref01 closed bag open bag strawberry zebra 
2-ref02 old newspaper recent newspaper cherry dog 
2-ref03 stripy cup spotty cup tv cucumber 
2-ref04 new phone old phone hat flower 
2-ref05 sleeping baby feeding baby butterfly tap 
2-ref06 full glass empty glass iron broom 
2-ref07 long skirt short skirt football toilet 
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2-ref08 short sock long sock spoon lobster 
2-ref09 tall vase short vase key bus 
2-ref10 small star big star house chick 
2-ref11 glass mug china mug duck corkscrew 
2-ref12 adult penguin baby penguin razor lamp 
2-ref13 square pan round pan pear fridge 
2-ref14 fresh apple rotten apple comb sausage 
2-ref15 dry stone wet stone cup door 
2-ref16 tall jug short jug kettle panda 
2-ref17 big cookie small cookie anchor hammer 
2-ref18 big cube small cube drum vase 
2-ref19 small hat big hat shoe cube 
2-ref20 small anchor big anchor drum boat 
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